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Abstract
The recent epistemological and cognitive studies concentrate on the concept of abduction, as a
means to originate and refine new ideas. Traditional cognitive science and computational accounts
concerning abduction aim at illustration discovery and creativity processes in terms of theoretical
and “internal” aspects, by means of computational simulations and/or abstract cognitive models.
I will illustrate in this paper that some typical internal abductive processes are involved in scientific
reasoning and discovery (for example through radical innovations). Nevertheless, especially concrete
manipulations of the external world constitute a fundamental passage in science: by a process of
manipulative abduction it is possible to build prostheses (epistemic mediators) for human minds,
by interacting with external objects and representations in a constructive way. In this manner it is
possible to create implicit knowledge through doing and to produce various opportunity to find, for
example, anomalies and fruitful new risky perspectives. This kind of embodied and unexpressed
knowledge holds a key role in the subsequent processes of scientific comprehension and discovery.
 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Theoretical and manipulative reasoning
Science is one of the most explicitly constructed, abstract, and creative forms of human
knowledge. In the twentieth century Reichenbachian and Popperian [1,2] distinction be-
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tween logic of discovery and logic of justification, and Kuhnian ideas about irrationality
of conceptual change and paradigm shift [3] brought philosophers of science to the direct
conclusion that a logic of discovery, and then a rational model of discovery, cannot exist.
Today researchers have by and large abandoned this attitude by concentrating on the
concept of abduction pointed out by C.S. Peirce as a fundamental mechanism by which it
is possible to account for the introduction of new explanatory hypotheses in science.
Abduction is the process of inferring certain facts and/or laws and hypotheses that ren-
der some sentences plausible, that explain or discover some (eventually new) phenomenon
or observation; it is the process of reasoning in which explanatory hypotheses are formed
and evaluated. There are two main epistemological meanings of the word abduction [4]: (1)
abduction that only generates “plausible” hypotheses (“selective” or “creative”) and (2) ab-
duction considered as inference “to the best explanation”, which also evaluates hypotheses.
An illustration from the field of medical knowledge, is represented by the discovery of a
new disease and the manifestations it causes which can be considered as the result of a
creative abductive inference. Therefore, “creative” abduction deals with the whole field of
the growth of scientific knowledge. This is irrelevant in medical diagnosis where instead
the task is to “select” from an encyclopedia of pre-stored diagnostic entities.
Theoretical abduction1 certainly illustrates much of what is important in creative ab-
ductive reasoning, in humans and in computational programs, but fails to account for many
cases of explanations occurring in science when the exploitation of environment is cru-
cial. It fails to account for those cases in which there is a kind of “discovering through
doing”, cases in which new and still unexpressed information is codified by means of ma-
nipulations of some external objects (epistemic mediators). The concept of manipulative
abduction2 captures a large part of scientific thinking where the role of action is central,
and where the features of this action are implicit and hard to be elicited: action can provide
otherwise unavailable information that enables the agent to solve problems by starting and
by performing a suitable abductive process of generation or selection of hypotheses.
Many attempts have been made to model abduction by developing some formal tools
in order to illustrate its computational properties and the relationships with the different
forms of deductive reasoning [6]. Some of the formal models of abductive reasoning are
based on the theory of the epistemic state of an agent [7], where the epistemic state of
an individual is modeled as a consistent set of beliefs that can change by expansion and
contraction (belief revision framework). These kinds of logical models are called sentential
[4]. They exclusively deal with selective abduction (diagnostic reasoning)3 and relate to the
idea of preserving consistency. Exclusively considering the sentential view of abduction
does not enable us to say much about creative processes in science, and, therefore, about
the nomological and most interesting creative aspects of abduction. It mainly refers to the
1 Magnani [4,5] introduces the concept of theoretical abduction. He maintains that there are two kinds of
theoretical abduction, “sentential”, related to logic and to verbal/symbolic inferences, and “model-based”, related
to the exploitation of internalized models of diagrams, pictures, etc., cf. below in this paper.
2 Manipulative abduction and epistemic mediators are introduced and illustrated in [4].
3 As previously indicated, it is important to distinguish between selective (abduction that merely selects from
an encyclopedia of pre-stored hypotheses), and creative abduction (abduction that generates new hypotheses).
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selective (diagnostic) and merely explanatory aspects of reasoning and to the idea that
abduction is mainly an inference to the best explanation [4].
2. The internal side of scientific change
2.1. The internal side of abductive reasoning
If we want to provide a suitable framework for analyzing the most interesting cases of
conceptual changes in science we do not have to limit ourselves to the sentential view of
theoretical abduction but we have to consider a broader inferential one: the model-based
sides of creative abduction (cf. below).
From Peirce’s philosophical point of view, all thinking is in signs, and signs can be
icons, indices or symbols. Moreover, all inference is a form of sign activity, where the word
sign includes “feeling, image, conception, and other representation” [8, 5.283], and, in
Kantian words, all synthetic forms of cognition. That is, a considerable part of the thinking
activity is model-based. Of course model-based reasoning acquires its peculiar creative
relevance when embedded in abductive processes, so that we can individuate a model-
based abduction.
Hence, we must think in terms of model-based abduction (and not in terms of senten-
tial abduction) to explain complex processes like scientific conceptual change. Different
varieties of model-based abductions [9] are related to the high-level types of scientific
conceptual change [10]. Following Nersessian [11], the term “model-based reasoning” is
used to indicate the construction and manipulation of various kinds of representations, not
mainly sentential and/or formal, but mental and/or related to external mediators.
2.2. Finding inconsistencies by radical innovation
It is well known that the derivation of inconsistencies contributes to the search for al-
ternative, and possibly new, hypotheses [1,12]. Surely surprise and curiosity are related to
the detection of inconsistencies [4, Chapter 6]. Internal model-based abductive ways of
generating a hypothesis that explains some phenomenon or conceptual problem that pro-
duced the question are heuristically linked to the activity itself both of finding that certain
puzzling phenomenon or that particular conceptual problem or of eliciting that certain “hid-
den” phenomenon or conceptual problem. Hence, they are related to the activity of finding
and producing chance.4 We will see that also from the perspective of a kind of reason-
ing we can call external (i.e., manipulative) typical templates of epistemic acting are still
devoted to generate inconsistencies and curiosities as new trends to reach—abduce—new
hypotheses.
I have illustrated above that from Peirce’s philosophical point of view, all inference is a
form of sign activity, where the word sign includes “feeling, image, conception, and other
representation” [8, 5.283]. That is, a considerable part of the inference activity is model-
based. Hence, many model-based ways of reasoning are performed in a manipulative way
4 It is clear that the phenomenon of chance discovery and production, and so of serendipity, can be seen in the
light of the role played by epistemic mediators and external representations, as described in Section 3.
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by using external tools and mediators (cf. the following section). Manipulative abduction
[4] happens when we are thinking through doing and not only, in a pragmatic sense, about
doing. So the idea of manipulative abduction goes beyond the well known role of experi-
ments as capable of forming new scientific laws by means of the results (nature’s answers
to the investigator’s question) they present, or of merely playing a predictive role (in confir-
mation and in falsification). Manipulative abduction refers to an extra-theoretical behavior
that aims at creating communicable accounts of new experiences to integrate them into
previously existing systems of experimental and linguistic (theoretical) practices. The ex-
istence of this kind of extra-theoretical cognitive behavior is also testified by the many
everyday situations in which humans are perfectly able to perform very efficacious (and
habitual) tasks without the immediate possibility of realizing their conceptual explanation.
In the following section manipulative abduction will be considered from the perspec-
tive of the relationship between unexpressed knowledge and external representations. The
power of model-based reasoning and abduction (both theoretical and manipulative) mainly
depends on their ability to extract and render explicit a certain amount of important in-
formation, unexpressed at the level of available data. They have a fundamental role in the
process of transformation of knowledge from its tacit to its explicit forms, and in the sub-
sequent elicitation and use of knowledge. Let us describe how this happens in the case of
“external” model-based processes.
3. Extracting knowledge through manipulative abduction
3.1. Unexpressed knowledge
As pointed out by Polanyi in his epistemological investigation, a large part of knowledge
is not explicit, but tacit: we know more than we can tell and we can know nothing without
relying upon those things which we may not be able to tell [13].
Hutchins [14] illustrates the case of a navigation instructor that for 3 years performed
an automatized task involving a complicated set of plotting manipulations and procedures.
The insight concerning the conceptual relationships between relative and geographic mo-
tion came to him suddenly “as lay in his bunk one night”.
We can find a similar situation also in the process of scientific creativity. Too often, in
the cognitive view of science, it has been underlined that conceptual change just involves a
theoretical and “internal” replacement of the main concepts. But usually researchers forget
that a large part of this processes are instead due to practical and “external” manipulations
of some kind, prerequisite to the subsequent work of theoretical arrangement and knowl-
edge creation. When these processes are creative we can speak of manipulative abduction
(cf. above).
For example, in the simple case of the construction and examination of diagrams in
elementary geometrical reasoning, specific experiments serve as states and the implied
operators are the manipulations and observations that transform one state into another.
The geometrical outcome depends upon practices and specific sensory-motor activities
performed on a non-symbolic object, which acts as a dedicated external representational
medium supporting the various operators at work. There is a kind of an epistemic negoti-
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ation between the sensory framework of the problem solver and the external reality of the
diagram [5]. It is well known that in the history of geometry many researchers used internal
mental imagery and mental representations of diagrams, but also self-generated diagrams
(external) to help their thinking.
This process involves an external representation consisting of written symbols and fig-
ures that for example are manipulated “by hand”. The cognitive system is not merely the
mind-brain of the person performing the geometrical task, but the system consisting of the
whole body (cognition is embodied) of the person plus the external physical representation.
In geometrical discovery the whole activity of cognition is located in the system consisting
of a human together with diagrams.
An external representation can modify the kind of computation that a human agent uses
to reason about a problem: the Roman numeration system eliminates, by means of the
external signs, some of the hardest parts of the addition, whereas the Arabic system does
the same in the case of the difficult computations in multiplication. The capacity for inner
reasoning and thought results from the internalization of the originally external forms of
representation [15].
The external representations are not merely memory aids: they can give people access
to knowledge and skills that are unavailable to internal representations, help researchers to
easily identify aspects and to make further inferences, they constrain the range of possible
cognitive outcomes in a way that some actions are allowed and others forbidden. They
increase the chance discoverability. The mind is limited because of the restricted range of
information processing, the limited power of working memory and attention, the limited
speed of some learning and reasoning operations; on the other hand the environment is
intricate, because of the huge amount of data, real time requirement, uncertainty factors.
3.2. The extra-theoretical dimension of discovery: templates of epistemic acting and
epistemic mediators
I have introduced above the notion of tacit knowledge. Now I propose an extension of
that concept. There is something more important beyond the tacit knowledge “internal” to
the subject—considered by Polanyi as personal, embodied and context specific. We can
also speak of a sort of tacit information “embodied” into the whole relationship between
our mind-body system and suitable external representations. An information we can ex-
tract, explicitly develop, and transform in knowledge contents, to solve problems.
Peirce gives an interesting example of model-based abduction related to sense activity:
“A man can distinguish different textures of cloth by feeling: but not immediately, for he
requires to move fingers over the cloth, which shows that he is obliged to compare sensa-
tions of one instant with those of another” [8, 5.221]. This surely suggests that abductive
movements have also interesting extra-theoretical characters and that there is a role in ab-
ductive reasoning for various kinds of manipulations of external objects. All knowing is
inferring and inferring is not instantaneous, it happens in a process that needs an activ-
ity of comparisons involving many kinds of models in a more or less considerable lapse
of time. All these considerations suggest, then, that there exist a creative form of think-
ing through doing, fundamental as much as the theoretical one: manipulative abduction
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(see [4] and [5]). As already said manipulative abduction happens when we are thinking
through doing and not only, in a pragmatic sense, about doing.
Various templates of manipulative behavior exhibit some regularities. The activity of
manipulating external things and representations is highly conjectural and not immedi-
ately explanatory: these templates are hypotheses of behavior (creative or already cogni-
tively present in the scientist’s mind-body system, and sometimes already applied) that
abductively enable a kind of epistemic “doing”. Hence, some templates of action and ma-
nipulation can be selected in the set of the ones available and pre-stored, others have to
be created for the first time to perform the most interesting creative cognitive accomplish-
ments of manipulative abduction.
Some common features of the tacit templates of manipulative abduction, that enable us
to manipulate things and experiments in science are related to: (1) sensibility towards the
aspects of the phenomenon which can be regarded as curious or anomalous; manipulations
have to be able to introduce potential inconsistencies in the received knowledge and so to
open new possible reasoning opportunities (Oersted’s report of his well known experiment
about electromagnetism is devoted to describing some anomalous aspects that did not de-
pend on any particular theory of the nature of electricity and magnetism); (2) preliminary
sensibility towards the dynamical character of the phenomenon, and not to entities and their
properties, common aim of manipulations is to practically reorder the dynamic sequence
of events into a static spatial one that should promote a subsequent bird’s-eye view (nar-
rative or visual-diagrammatic), fruitful for further outcomes; (3) referral to experimental
manipulations that exploit artificial apparatus to free new possible stable and repeatable
sources of information about hidden knowledge and constraints (Davy set-up in terms of
an artifactual tower of needles showed that magnetization was related to orientation and
does not require physical contact); (4) various contingent ways of epistemic acting: look-
ing from different perspectives, checking the different information available, comparing
subsequent events, choosing, discarding, imaging further manipulations, re-ordering and
changing relationships in the world by implicitly evaluating the usefulness of a new order
(for instance, to help memory).
Gooding [16] refers to this kind of concrete manipulative reasoning when he illustrates
the role in science of the so-called “construals” that embody tacit inferences in procedures
that are often apparatus and machine based. The embodiment is of course an expert ma-
nipulation of objects in a highly constrained experimental environment, and is directed
by abductive movements that imply the strategic application of old and new templates of
behavior mainly connected with extra-theoretical components, for instance emotional, es-
thetical, ethical, and economic.
The whole activity of manipulation is devoted to building various external epistemic me-
diators that function as an enormous new source of information and knowledge. Therefore,
manipulative abduction represents a kind of redistribution of the epistemic and cognitive
effort to manage objects and information that cannot be immediately represented or found
internally (for example exploiting the resources of visual imagery).5
5 It is difficult to preserve precise spatial and geometrical relationships using mental imagery, in many situa-
tions, especially when one set of them has to be moved relative to another.
L. Magnani / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 439–450 445
From the point of view of everyday situations manipulative abductive reasoning and
epistemic mediators exhibit very interesting features: (1) action elaborates a simplification
of the reasoning task and a redistribution of effort across time [14], when we need to ma-
nipulate concrete things in order to understand structures which are otherwise too abstract
[17], or when we are in presence of redundant and unmanageable information; (2) action
can be useful in presence of incomplete or inconsistent information—not only from the
“perceptual” point of view—or of a diminished capacity to act upon the world: it is used to
get more data to restore coherence and to improve deficient knowledge; (3) action enables
us to build external artifactual models of task mechanisms instead of the corresponding
internal ones, that are adequate to adapt the environment to the agent’s needs; (4) action as
a control of sense data illustrates how we can change the position of our body (and/or of
the external objects) and how to exploit various kinds of prostheses (Galileo’s telescope,
technological instruments and interfaces) to get various new kinds of stimulation: action
provides some tactile and visual information (e.g., in surgery), otherwise unavailable. Also
natural phenomena can play the role of external artifactual models: under Micronesians’
manipulations of their images, the stars acquire a structure that “becomes one of the most
important structured representational media of the Micronesian system” [14, p. 172]. The
external artifactual models are endowed with functional properties as components of a
memory system crossing the boundary between person and environment (for example they
are able to transform the tasks involved in allowing simple manipulations that promote
further visual inferences at the level of model-based abduction). The cognitive process is
distributed between a person (or a group of people) and external representation(s), and so
obviously embedded and situated in a society and in a historical culture.6
3.3. Mirroring hidden properties through optical diagrams
An interesting epistemological situation I have recently studied is the one concerning
the discovery role played by some special epistemic mediators in the field of non-standard
analysis, an “alternative calculus” invented by Abraham Robinson [19], based on infinites-
imal numbers in the spirit of Leibniz method. It is a kind of calculus that uses an extension
of the real numbers system R to the system R∗ containing infinitesimals smaller in the
absolute value than any positive real number. I maintain that in mathematics diagrams play
various roles in a typical abductive way. Two of them are central:
• they provide an intuitive and mathematical explanation capable of facilitating the
understanding of concepts difficult to grasp, that appear hidden, obscure, and/or epis-
temologically unjustified, or that are not expressible from an intuitive point of view;
6 Magnani [4, Chapter 6] stresses the importance of the so-called preinventive forms in abductive reasoning.
Intuitively an anomaly is something surprising, as Peirce already knew “The breaking of a belief can only be due
to some novel experience” [8, 5.524] or “[. . .] until we find ourselves confronted with some experience contrary
to those expectations” [8, 7.36]. Therefore it is not strange that something anomalous can be found in those kinds
of structures the cognitive psychologists call preinventive. Cognitive psychologists have described many kinds of
preinventive structures and their desirable properties, that constitute particularly interesting ways of “irritating”
the mind and stimulating creativity [18]: they are certainly of interest for creative reasoning and chance discovery
and production.
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• they help create new previously unknown concepts.
In the construction of mathematical concepts many external representations are ex-
ploited, both in terms of diagrams and of symbols. I am interested in my research in
diagrams which play an optical role—microscopes (that look at the infinitesimally small
details), telescopes (that look at infinity), windows (that look at a particular situation), a
mirror role (to externalize rough mental models), and an unveiling role (to help create new
and interesting mathematical concepts, theories, and structures).7
The role of an “optical microscope” that shows the behavior of a tangent line is il-
luminating. In standard analysis, the change dy in y along the tangent line is only an
approximation of the change y in y along the curve. But through an optical microscope,
that shows infinitesimal details, we can see that dy = y and then the quotient y/x is
the same of dy/dx when dx = x is infinitesimal (see Fig. 1 and, for details, [20]). This
removes some difficulties of the representation of the tangent line as limit of secants, and
introduces a more intuitive conceptualization: the tangent line “merges” with the curve in
an infinitesimal neighborhood of the contact point.
Only through a second more powerful optical microscope “within” the first (I call this
kind of epistemic mediator microscopes within microscopes), we can see the difference
between the tangent line and the curve. Under the first diagram, the curve looks like the
graph of
f ′(a)x,
i.e., a straight line with the same slope of its tangent line;8 under the second, the curve
looks like
f ′(a)x − 1
2
f ′′(a).
This suggests nice new mental representations of the concept of tangent line: through
the optical lens, the tangent line can be seen as the curve, but through a more powerful
optical lens the graph of the function and the graph of the tangent are distinct, straight, and
7 The epistemic and cognitive role of mirror and unveiling diagrams in the discovery of non-Euclidean geom-
etry is illustrated in [5].
8 This is mathematically justified in [20].
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parallel lines. The fact that one line is either below or above the other, depends on the sign
of f ′′(a), in accordance with the standard real theory: if f ′′(x) is positive (or negative) in a
neighborhood, then f is convex (or concave) here and the tangent line is below (or above)
the graph of the function.
However, this easily mirrors a sophisticated hidden property. Let f be a two times
differentiate function and let a be a flex point of it. Then f ′′(a) = 0 and so the second
microscope shows again the curve as the same straight line: this means that the curve is
“very straight” in its flex point a. Of course, we already know this property—the curvature
in a flex point of a differentiable two times function is null—which comes from standard
analysis, but through optical diagrams we can find it immediately and more easily (the
standard concept of curvature is not immediate).
Some diagrams could also play an unveiling role, providing new light on mathematical
structures: it can be hypothesized that these diagrams can lead to further interesting creative
results.
I stated that in mathematics diagrams play various roles in a typical abductive way. We
can add that:
• they are epistemic mediators able to perform various abductive tasks in so far as,
• they are external representations which provide explanatory and abductive results also
fruitful in some aspects of creative reasoning chance discovery and production.
4. The morphodynamics of discovery
We have seen that the “bodily” manipulation of external objects is central to delineating
new conceptual perspectives and solutions (cf. the previous section concerning the features
of the tacit templates of manipulative abduction and external epistemic mediators). Hence,
an intentional “action” in the world is able to add a prosthesis to the mind, by expanding
its possibilities and by suggesting new information worth to be analyzed.
Traditional cognitive science accounts refer to the computational perspective, that de-
scribes cognition as the operation of a special mental “computer” that computes different
internal symbolic representations. This approach is considered too reductive, since it is
based on the functionalist hypothesis (which cannot render the external dimension of cog-
nition), and on a computation of static entities.
Interesting insights on the problem of hypotheses generation and discovery, in terms of
dynamical evolution of complex systems, come from a different contrasting approach: the
dynamical approach to cognitive science. We can use the mathematical tools of dynamical
systems to study cognition by thinking to a cognitive system not just as a computer, but
as a dynamical system, consisting of mind, body, and external environment, mutually and
simultaneously influencing and coevolving. This also justifies the pragmatic and “embod-
ied” aspects of cognition. This kind of cognitive modeling is able to describe abductive
processes as embedded dynamical entities “unfolding” in time. Hence, by means of the
tools provided by a dynamical modeling it is possible to underline the importance of ma-
nipulative skills in scientific cognition [21].
A dynamical system can be considered a set of quantitative variables that changes con-
tinually and concurrently in time in accordance with dynamical laws described by some set
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of equations. It is the state of the system that changes: that is, the overall look of the system
in a certain instant. We can study the behavior of the system by analyzing the change in its
states. If a system can be described dynamically, this means it has n characteristics (e.g.,
position, mass, etc.—in the case of classical physical systems) evolving simultaneously in
time. These characteristics can be measured, in any given instant, and associated to a real
number. Therefore, the overall state of the system can be thought as an ordered set consist-
ing of n real numbers, and the state space can be thought as isomorphic to a space of real
numbers, the n dimensions of which correspond to the different system characteristics (the
phase space). The evolution of the system in time corresponds to a sequence of points, a
trajectory, inside the phase space. This sequence can usually be described mathematically
as a function of time, considered an independent variable, giving a solution to the system
of differential equations. The idea that the behavior of the system can be understood geo-
metrically by a trajectory of points in a space, that is, describable in terms of positions
and change of positions in a space of possible overall states, it is the central insight of dy-
namical systems theory. We can then describe the system in terms of attractors, stability,
and catastrophes, features largely invisible from a classical perspective, but fundamental
to describe some cognitive processes underlying abduction.
We speak about morphodynamics of discovery when considering discovery and produc-
tion in the light of the “geometrical” framework above. The main idea is that a complex
system, as the cognitive one, can be described in terms of a configurational structure. That
is, different mental states are defined by their geometrical relationships within a larger
dynamical environment. This suggests that the system, in any given instant, possesses a
general morphology we can study by observing how it changes and develops. The term
morphodynamics refers to those theories whose aim is to explain morphologies and iconic,
schematic, Gestalt-like aspects of structures, whatever their underlying physical substrate
may be, using the mathematical theory of dynamical systems [22].
To set the morphology of the system it is interesting to identify mental states with at-
tractors. Some dynamical systems are so complex, behaving non-linearly and erratically,
jumping from a point in the space of their states to another very different in a brief time
(as the states of the atmosphere). However, notwithstanding these sudden changes, a dy-
namical system has a series of states, the attractors, which tend to remain stable (Fig. 2).
A system can have a lot of attractors, contemplating more than a single stable state,
arranged in some topological way.
The arrangement of attractors can be thought as controlled by the setting of the pa-
rameters in the equations that govern the system’s dynamics. The shape and location of
attractors change as these parameters vary. There could be certain critical settings of para-
meters where complete qualitative discontinuities and transformations in the arrangement
of attractors occur (they can move, disappear or emerge). These discontinuities are respon-
sible for the evolution of mental processes.
The concept of attractor, together with the interesting concepts of adumbration and an-
ticipation, studied in the philosophical tradition of phenomenology,9 can offer interesting
9 The so-called naturalized phenomenology aims at supporting phenomenology with scientific explanations,
neurophysiological, mathematical, physical, etc. [23].
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plane as far as it falls in a hollow like that in the picture. The marble will rotate inside it; then it will reach the
resting position, at the bottom. Attractor is the stationary point corresponding to that position.
insights to understand how external representations and action support the “mind” in dis-
covering and unveiling new concepts [24]. Imagine the overall state space of the cognitive
system as a geometrical surface in which possible mental states (represented by attractors)
interact. Like in the case of the intuitive representation of the relativistic conception of
gravitation, we can see this surface as a flat horizontal rubber sheet. Attractor corresponds
to the attractive zone in which we can imagine to place a large sphere. Its weight will
stretch the sheet down and distort the system. Therefore, if we imagine the behavior of the
cognitive system as a small ball that moves inside the rubber sheet, we can easily see how
the structure, the “shape” of the space, affects its motion. The parameters responsible for
the behavior of the system determine the “weight” of the attractor, then the shape of the
surface (one of the influencing factors is just what here is called manipulative abduction).
5. Conclusion
It is clear that the manipulation of external objects helps human beings in reasoning
and discovery and so in their creative tasks. I have illustrated the strategic role played by
the so-called traditional concept of “implicit knowledge” in terms of the recent cognitive
and epistemological concept of manipulative abduction, considered as a particular kind of
abduction that exploits external models endowed with delegated cognitive roles and at-
tributes. Abductive manipulations operate on models that are external and the strategy that
organizes the manipulations is unknown a priori. In the case of “creative” manipulations
of course the result achieved is also new, and adds properties not previously contained.
I have described various “templates” of manipulative behavior which account for the
most common cognitive and epistemic behaviors related to scientific discovery and chance
production. I have stressed the importance of producing inconsistencies by radical inno-
vation at the level of internal abductive processes but also in the case of manipulative
thinking, where epistemic mediators constitute interesting ways of finding anomalies and
“curious” events, unexpected dynamical features of phenomena, contingent ways of epis-
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temic acting, and manage incomplete data and information to anticipate new trends and
hidden objects and properties.
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